| Gattigap |
01-03-2005 12:25 PM |
What's This About?
Quote:
Originally posted by Hank Chinaski
Do you have evidence that there are approved plans for a better armored vehicle, and that the Pentagon didn't move to get them, given the strictures of Government procurement law?
No.
Oh. So are you saying the Pentagon should bypass procurement requirements- or are you just throwing up outside your mouth here?
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What a pity. The oldskool Hank would actually google something before talking shit. Looks like Hank version 2005.0 is still curled 'round the holiday egg nog. I'm no military expert, Hank, but two minutes on Google turns up a number of things.
The Boston Globe tells us that much of this fuckup derives from affirmative decisions that Army officials made to sole source this stuff.
- Such complaints have put heat on the Army to explain itself, in the wake of Rumsfeld's Dec. 8 statement that the work was going as fast as possible.
Yet Army officials say they don't need the help. Instead they have set up a $4.1 billion armor industry that's a mix of federal weapons depots and a few big privately owned factories.
***
The starting point in the debate, Ludes and Motsek agree, are two key decisions Army officials made in mid-2003 and stuck with since. The first was a decision to keep orders within a network of current suppliers rather than bring new contractors into the mix.
This is known as "sole-sourcing," and led to a massive boost of orders for a few companies, notably Armor Holdings Inc. of Jacksonville, Fla.
The company's O'Gara-Hess unit produces what are known as "up-armored" Humvees, which add more than a ton of bulletproof windows and steel plating to the basic Humvee made by AM General LLC of South Bend, Ind. Before the war began, O'Gara-Hess was making 30 up-armored Humvees a month, mostly for military policing duties and scouting. As of December it had vastly expanded its factory near Cincinnati and was producing 450 of the trucks per month. In all there were 5,910 in Iraq by mid-December, approaching the total of 8,105 that commanders want.
New suppliers might have set up additional large factories to armor Humvees too, but the Army passed. For one thing, the service hasn't purchased from O'Gara-Hess the design data that would make it easier for another contractor to set up a factory. Smaller companies are left with the business of supplying components, not complete vehicles.
"For better or worse, it has made it more difficult for the Army to go to alternate sources," said Marc A. King, vice president for armor operations of Ceradyne Inc. of Costa Mesa, Calif., which supplies ceramic body armor plates and some kits for vehicles.
If your ramble really was asking a question about upgrading to something else, you could look at the Stryker, a new armored vehicle that the Army wanted to rush into production but which apparently sucks:
- May 10 issue - Tom Christie was worried. It was the fall of 2003, and the Pentagon's chief weapons tester had noted problems with the Army's pride and joy, the new Stryker Armored Vehicle. The $4 billion program was seen as the vanguard of the lighter, high-speed Army of the future. But even with new add-on armor, the Stryker "did not meet Army requirements" against rocket-propelled grenades in tests, Christie wrote in his 2003 annual report. Now the Pentagon was about to deploy the first 300 Strykers to Iraq while an insurgency raged.
So Christie did something unusual: he sent a classified letter to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's office urging the military to be very cautious about where in Iraq it deployed the Stryker. The response? "I was slapped down," says the straight-talking Christie. "It was: 'What are we supposed to do with this [letter]? ... Are you trying to embarrass somebody?' "
There may be embarrassment to come. Six months after that exchange, the fighting in Iraq has called into question not only the Stryker's effectiveness but the Army's shift toward a lighter, faster infantry. With a record 138 U.S. soldiers dead in April, some inside the Pentagon are asking why the Army spent billions on new wheeled vehicles like the Stryker when commanders in the field are crying out for old-style treaded vehicles—tanks and personnel carriers—that are better protected and armed.
Many soldiers killed and wounded in Iraq were traveling in thin-skinned Humvees, which ride on rubber tires like the Stryker. Meanwhile, thousands of M113 armored personnel carriers, which are treaded and better armed, sit in mothballs around the world, even next door in Kuwait. That reflects an Army bias that has been prevalent since 1999, when the then Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki—who was frustrated by slow-moving U.S. armor in the Balkans—declared his preference for wheels.
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