The Dems have hit on a strategy
 

1856 - John Fremont? Dems - Andrew Jackson or Thomas Jefferson - opinoins vary. But people have been sacrificing policy for political gain since the beginning of the Republic.

The Dems have hit on a strategy
 

There was a nice history in the NYT Mag a couple of weeks ago, apparently cribed from wikipedia. Anyway, depends on whether you mean founded by name or practice, as the GOP grew out of the whigs, whicch were founded earlier.

The Dems have hit on a strategy
 

The point is that your conservatism stems not from the specific but from the generalities. As does my liberalism.

The narrow perspective is that you view the world as one in which things must be judged morally, black and white, right and wrong, which, in combination with a need to recognize authority, makes it difficult for you to accept alternate perspectives and viewpoints.

It is not much a retort to call me a moral relativist, by the way.

What I'm saying is that a lot of the things you attempt to throw in the face of liberals are things that provoke the response "so what" from us, and vice versa, because we simply look at the world differently.

I really think you should read Lakoff's book. It weighs in at almost 500 pages; I'm not going to be able to adequately capture it in more than general terms here.

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0226467716

The Dems have hit on a strategy
 

Spanky can't read that right now. He is reading Collapse or he is getting left out of the museum tour.

The Dems have hit on a strategy
 

Paint on WPA buildings dried!

. . . but I didn't attack him or call him "unpatriotic."
 

• On the playground, discussion turned to war critics in America. "I've always respected John Murtha as a patriot and a friend of the military," said first-grader Abdul Zeki. "So I was somewhat surprised that he has taken the Jane Fonda position on the war."

Grade-School Children Invite Marines to Reunion (from The Baghdad Post).

(Slate's take on the fake news stuff)

What to do
 

You have some interesting ideas. However, I don't know that Balkanization of Iraq will work in the long run, for two reasons. First, Iran and Turkey will definitely not back an independent Kurdistan for fear of infecting the Kurds in their own countries. Second, divvying up Iraq will be complicated by the fact that oil isn't equally distributed, nor is arable land. There will be too much argument over compensating the regions tha lack resources.

I agree that the need for political support is great right now, but I don't think that strong institutions can be built without the muscle to back them up. The Iraqi military and police force is making some progress. However, I don't think they are ready to shoulder the burden of maintaining order without US military support. Add to that some evidence that certain elements within the Iraqi police force seem to be using their power to oppress the Sunni majority in some towns and it becomes pretty clear to me that we can't back out yet.

I would like to see some use of international Arab forces to supplement US military. I don't know that this is going to be achievable without increasing at least the perception of Balkanization, though. I don't know that the sects will be able to or willing to cooperate, no matter how much it's necessary to stabilize the country.

But you do have some interesting ideas.

What to do
 

Eugene McCarthy essentially campaigned on the "Get out of Vietnam, it's a millstone around our neck" strategy in 1968. McGovern's campaign had similar elements to it.

What to do
 

Well, among other things, the Congress can withdraw the authorization to engage militarily. Without a formal declaration of war, Bush's ability to lawfully remain in Iraq is limited. In addition, Congress can decide not to appropriate funds for any military action in Iraq.

You are generally familiar with the way our government works, aren't you?

The Dems have hit on a strategy
 

Not necessarily. The Republicans have been lying about tax "reform" and the estate tax for decades now and they seem to be gaining a great deal of ground from the fact that the majority of Americans don't understand their manipulation of the truth.

What to do
 

I'm just trying to throw some things out for discussion.

One big question is: Is Balkanization a force that can be successfully resisted? In the Balkan's today, stability is based on the idea that each ethnic group has their own playpen - I don't know how much permanency this solution has, and it seems to require some external cops to keep it from exploding.

Turkey is going to have to get over Kurds having power in Iraq. They have it now, and are not going to lose it soon. A separate, weaker Kurdistan may be less threatening than a strong Iraqi state with Kurds high in the leadership.

No one can ever control the historical forces they unleash, and we have unleashed some interesting one's here. What do we need to do to get ahead of them instead? My principal disagreements with the administration stem from the fact that I expect history to be continuous, and have no reason to think a major rupture has occurred. What has been likely will be, though the form will develop and the dominant parties will shift over time. On the other hand, the Bush administration appears to believe that they can radically reshape the forces at work in the Middle East from the outside.

Adam's Rib
 

This attack makes you sound like a shrill harpy. I'm just sayin'...

What to do
 

There was a guy on NPR yesterday who said a lot of the same things that Cap'n said. He is a former ambassador to Croatia and has been advising the Kurds to some extent. I thought the interview was fascinating in light of the discussions going on here for the last two days. He was advocating a loose confederation of sorts with a central government, and he said that since the North and the South have their own armies and the Kurds have been out on their own for years anyways, Iraq is pretty much on its way towards that end. He didn't see how it was possible to have a unified Iraq that was democratic, though.

What to do
 

In today's Balkans, peace was bought at the cost of incre3dible bloodshed, and is maintained by the express and implied threat of outside intervention if the bloodshed starts up again.

Furthermore, the ethnic conflicts and feuds in the Middle East have been going on for centuries and show no sign of subsiding. Unequal access to natural resources increases this tension. Witness the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. One lesson that can be drawn is that the unleashing of ethnic tensions is greatly exacerbated by the intervention and subsequent withdrawal of foreign influences.

The Muslims. Sephardic jews, and Arab Christians lived in relative peace alongside each other for close to 500 years before Britain and France began their colonial adventures there. Has there been a single day of peace since they left?

Dear God
 

Dear God
 

Why aren't they using this picture?

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/...gibson_184.jpg

Dear God
 

how much does he charge to have his baby?

What to do
 

I missed this, but this point is the key one.

If you have disparate people who can't get along, a centralized government ends up essentially beating everyone into submission or watching the country come aparat at the seems. Centralized governments with warring populations become by necessity autocratic. Right now, it appears the Sunnis will be the first target. But, remember, first they come for...

Dear God
 

Regular conception or immaculate?

What to do
 

You should listen to the interview. I think you'd find yourself agreeing with him. He mentioned the former Yukoslavia and the Soviet Union a lot in his discussion, and he was hopeful that the transition was going to be more in line with what happened to the old USSR.

My uninformed Opinion........
 

I think Iraq is going to split into two parts. The Kurds want an independent state. They always have. I don't think they have any intention of staying in Iraq in the long term. I think they are just biding time until they make the jump. Yes Turkey and Iran won't like it but I don't think there is much they can do about it.

The big issues is when they break if the rest of Iraq will let them go. My guess is they will because Iraqi Kurdistan has been operating as a separate country since 1991.

Another issues is when Kurdistan becomes independent if there will be uprising in Turkish Kurdistand and Iran Kurdistan demanding union with the former Iraqi Kurdistan (there is even a province in Iran named Kurdistan). They are the fourth biggest ethnic group in the Middle East ( Arab:1, Turks 2 Persians 3 Kurds 4) and they are the only ones without a state. I think this is a strong possiblity (however, this does not bother me because I think the Kurds got screwed after WWI and they should have their own state).

The rest of Iraq is a different story. I think Ethnic divides are much stronger than religious divides. In addition, there are too many Shiites in the Sunni controlled area making split to messy. I also don't think the Sunnis want to separate and since the Shiites are in the majority they really won't want to separate. Meaning, right now the Shiites want distance from the Sunnis because they have been abused by the Sunnis but once they realize they are in the majority and that is key in a Democrat state they will be inclined to stay together.

So my prediction - there will be a Kurdistan and then the rest of Iraq will stay together and there will be Sunni insurgency for many years in the remaining but eventually it will run out of steam.

Dear God
 

You know I will try. He could win the primary but he would be crushed by a Democrat. California is just like New York. Social conservatives don't have a prayer.

What to do
 

I will try to listen tonight at home. I can't listen here.

My uninformed Opinion........
 

Interesting and perceptive.

So if there is a likely split, should we help enable it, with something like a plebiscite, in hopes of avoiding the bloodshed that might occur if the split is instead forced?

An informed Opinion....
 

Stratfor's takes on Iraq:

Military Lessons Learned in Iraq and Strategic Implications
By George Friedman

Among the things that emerge from every war, won or lost, are "lessons learned." Each war teaches the military on both sides strategic, operational, tactical and technical lessons that apply in future wars. Many of these lessons are useful. Some can be devastating. The old adage that "generals are always fighting the last war" derives from the failure to learn appropriate lessons or the failure to apply lessons properly. For example, the lessons learned from the First World War, applied to the Second, led to the Maginot Line. They also led to the blitzkrieg. "Lessons learned" cuts both ways.

Sometimes lessons must be learned in the middle of a war. During World War II, for example, the United States learned and applied lessons concerning the use of aircraft carriers, the proper employment of armor and the execution of amphibious operations. The Germans, when put on the defensive, did not rapidly learn the lessons of defensive warfare on a strategic level. The Allies won. The Germans lost. There were certainly other factors at work in that war, but the speed at which lessons are assimilated and applied is a critical factor in determining the outcomes of wars. It has been said that success in war is rooted in the element of surprise; it follows that overcoming surprise is the corollary of this principle.

Lessons are learned and applied most quickly at the tactical level. Squads, platoons and companies, which are most closely in contact with the enemy and have the most immediate thing at stake -- their very lives -- tend to learn and adapt the most quickly. One measure of morale is the speed at which troops in contact with the enemy learn and change. One measure of command flexibility is the extent to which these changes are incorporated into doctrine. In addition, a measure of command effectiveness is the speed at which the operational and strategic lessons are learned and implemented. It usually takes longer for generals to understand what they are doing than it does sergeants. But in the end, the sergeants cannot compensate for the generals, or the politicians.

In the Iraq war, both sides have experienced pleasant and unpleasant surprises. For instance, the Americans were pleasantly surprised when their worst-case scenario did not materialize: The Iraqi army did not attempt to make a stand in Baghdad, forcing the U.S. military into urban attritional warfare. And the Iraqi insurgents were pleasantly surprised at the length of time it took the Americans to realize that they were facing guerrilla warfare, and the resulting slowness with which the U.S. military responded to the attacks.

On the other hand, the Americans were surprised by the tenacity of the insurgency -- both the guerrillas' ability to absorb casualties and the diffusion of their command structure, which provided autonomy to small units yet at the same time gave the guerrillas the ability to surge attacks at politically sensitive points. And the insurgents had to have been surprised by the rapid tactical learning curve that took place on the U.S. side, imposing a high cost on guerrilla operations, as well as the political acumen that allowed the Americans and others to contain the insurgency to the Sunni regions.

In a strategic sense, the Iraqi insurgents had the simpler battle problem. Insurgency has fewer options. An insurgency must:

1. Maintain relations with a host population that permits for regrouping, recruitment and re-supply. While this can be coerced, the primary problem is political, in the need to align the insurgency with the interests of local leaders.

2. Deny intelligence to the enemy by using the general population to camouflage its operations -- thus forcing the enemy to mount operations that simultaneously fail to make contact with insurgents and also alienate the general populace. Alternatively, if the enemy refuses to attack the population, this must be used to improve the insurgents' security position.

3. Use the target-rich environment of enemy deployments and administrative centers to execute unpredictable attacks, thereby increasing the enemy's insecurity and striking at his morale.

The guerrillas' purpose is to engender a sense of psychological helplessness in their conventional enemy, with the goal of forcing that enemy to abandon the fight or else to engage in negotiations as a means of defense.

The guerrilla does not have to win militarily. His goal is not to lose. The essence of asymmetric warfare is not merely the different means used to fight the war, but the different interests in waging the war. In Vietnam, the fundamental difference between the two sides was this: The North Vietnamese had a transcendent interest in the outcome of the war -- nothing mattered more than winning -- whereas for the Americans, Vietnam was simply one interest among a range of interests; it was not of transcendent importance. Thus, the North Vietnamese could lose more forces without losing their psychological balance. The Americans, faced with much lower losses but a greater sense of helplessness and uncertainty, sought an exit from a war that the North Vietnamese had neither an interest nor a means of exiting.

Now, Vietnam was more of a conventional war than people think. The first principle of insurgency -- drawing sustenance and cover from a local population -- was a major factor before the intervention of main-line North Vietnamese units. After that, these units relied more on the Ho Chi Minh Trail than on the local populace for supplies, and on terrain and vegetation more than on the public for cover. It was at times less a guerrilla war than a conventional war waged on discontinuous fronts. Nevertheless, the principle of asymmetric interest still governed absolutely: The North Vietnamese were prepared to pay a higher price than the Americans in waging the war, since they had greater interests at stake.

The United States fought a counterinsurgency in Vietnam. It should have tried to reformulate the conflict as a conventional war. First, the Ho Chi Minh Trail was the strategic center of gravity of the war, and cutting that line would have been a conventional move. Second, operating in a counterinsurgency mode almost guaranteed defeat. Some have argued that the U.S. difficulty with counterinsurgency warfare is its unwillingness to be utterly ruthless. That is not a tenable explanation. Neither the Nazis nor the Soviets could be faulted with insufficient ruthlessness; nevertheless, the Yugoslav Partisan detachments drained the Nazis throughout their occupation, and the Afghan guerrillas did the same to the Soviets. Counterinsurgency warfare is strategically and tactically difficult.

The problem for occupying forces is that -- unlike the insurgents, who merely must not lose -- the counterinsurgents must win. And because of asymmetric interests, time is never on their side. The single most important strategic error the Americans made in Vietnam was in assuming that since they could not be defeated militarily, they might not win the war, but it was impossible that they could lose it. They failed to understand the principle of asymmetry: Unless the United States won the war in a reasonable period of time, continuing to wage the war would become irrational. Time is on the side of guerrillas who have a sustainable force.

The United States did not expect a guerrilla war in Iraq. It was not part of the war plan. When the guerrilla war began, it took U.S. leaders months to understand what was happening. When they did understand what was happening, they assumed that time was at the very least a neutral issue. Having launched the war in the context of the Sept. 11 attacks, the Americans assumed that they had interests in Iraq that were as great as those of the insurgents.

But as in other guerrilla wars, the occupying power has shown itself to have less interest in occupying the country than the resistance has in resisting. It is not the absolute cost in casualties, but rather the perception of helplessness and frustration the insurgent creates, that eats away at both the occupying force and the public of the occupying country. By not losing -- by demonstrating that he will survive intense counterinsurgency operations without his offensive capabilities being diminished -- the insurgent forces the occupier to consider the war in the context of broader strategic interests.

One of two things happens here: The occupier can launch more intense military operations, further alienating the general populace while increasing cover for the insurgents -- or, alternatively, attempt to create a native force to wage the war. "Vietnamization" was an attempt by the United States to shift the burden of the war to the Vietnamese, under the assumption that defeating the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong was more in the interests of the South Vietnamese than in the interests of the Americans. In Iraq, the Americans are training the Iraqi army.

The U.S. option in Vietnam was to impose a conventional model of warfare -- much as the United States did in Korea, when it ignored the guerrillas and forced the war into a battle of conventional forces. It is even more difficult to impose a conventional war in Iraq than it might have been in Vietnam under an alternative American strategy. Here, attacking the insurgents' line of supply is a tenuous strategy -- not because the line does not exist, but because the dependency on it is less. The insurgents in Iraq operate at lower levels of intensity than did the Vietnamese. The ratio of supplies they need to bring into their battle box, relative to the supplies they can procure within their battle box, is low. They can live off the Sunni community for extended periods of time. They can survive -- and therefore, in the classic formulation, win -- even if lines of supply are cut.

The Sunni guerrillas in Iraq have all of the classic advantages that apply to insurgency, save one: There are indigenous forces in Iraq that are prepared to move against them and that can be effective. The Shiite and Kurdish forces are relatively well-trained (in the Iraqi context) and are highly motivated. They are not occupiers of Iraq, but co-inhabitants. Unlike the Americans, they are not going anywhere. They have as much stake in the outcome of the war and the future of their country as the guerrillas. That changes the equation radically.

All wars end either in the annihilation of the enemy force or in a negotiated settlement. World War II was a case of annihilation. Most other wars are negotiated. For the United States, Vietnam was a defeat under cover of negotiation. That is usually the case where insurgencies are waged: By the time the occupation force moves to negotiations, it is too late. Iraq has this difference, and it is massive: Other parties are present who are capable and motivated -- parties other than the main adversaries.

The logic here, therefore, runs to a negotiated settlement. The Bush administration has stated that these negotiations are under way. The key to the negotiations is the threat of civil war -- the potential that the Shia, the main component of a native Iraqi force, will crush the minority Sunnis. There is more to this, of course: The very perception of this possibility has driven a number of Sunnis to cooperate in efforts to put down the insurgency, looking to secure their future in a post-occupation Iraq. But it is the volatility of relations between the ethnic groups underlying the negotiations that can shift the outcome in this case for the United States.

All war is political in nature. It is shaped by politics and has a political end. In World War II, the nature of the combatants and the rapid learning curve of the Allies allowed for a rare victory, in which the outcome was the absolute capitulation of the enemy. In Vietnam, the nature of the war and the failure of the American side to learn and evolve strategy led to a political process that culminated in North Vietnam achieving its political goals. In Iraq, the question is whether, given the combatants, the complete defeat of either side appears likely. Even if the United States withdraws, a civil war could continue. Therefore, the issue is whether the conflict has matured sufficiently to permit a political resolution that is acceptable to both sides. As each learns the capabilities of the other and assimilates their own lessons of the war, we suspect that a political settlement will be the most likely outcome.

My uninformed Opinion........
 

I think Bush and Condi think they can keep it together. I think they are wrong. That is why the Kurds are waiting for the US to pull out before they make their move.

If I were in charge I would pressure the Iraqi government to allow the split. But I think Bush and Condi will see it as a failure on their part if there is a split and really do whatever they can to stop the split. Whether or not they will encourage the rest of Iraq to use force - I don't know.

I think the split is inevitable but I also think the US will try and prevent it which is unfortunate.

Dear God
 

npi. sts. nice one, Spankster!

Dear God
 

I realize I am in the dog house. I promise - soon as Collapse gets here I will tackle it immediately.

Dear God
 

Go to the store, Mr. Works-At-Home. Christ. This is the lamest excuse I have ever heard.

My uninformed Opinion........
 

Most of my friends think I am crazy, but I think the Ethnic Nation State is what people gravitate towards. I think that it is the natural state of politics. That is why the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czeckoslavakia never really had a chance. If you look at Europe it eventually ended up split along ethnic lines. There are a few exception like Belgium (which is on the verge of splitting) and Switzerland. I think the only reason Austria has not merged with Germany is because of WWII. It would freak everyone out. Swizerland is really the only exception.

Stalin understood this that is why when he gave Eastern Germany (Prussia - Pomerania, Silesia and Kalingrad) to Poland he cleaned out all the Germans and made them move to the rump of Germamy. He gave Konigsberg to Russia, cleaned out all the Germans and renamed it Kalingrad. He Knew that if he left the Germans they would eventually want to reunify with a greater Germany.

I think the Middle East has not had the chance to do what comes naturally. Mainly because it was colonized and random lines were drawn. But I think eventually all of the states will change to conform to ethnic boundaries. That means eventually a unified Arabia. All the people want it is just the leaders that don't. All the leaders have to give unity lip service when the run for office. The main goal of the Baathist party was Arab unification. But when they took power in Syria and Iraq the leaders did not want to give up control to a larger state and betrayed the goals of the revolution. But eventually the people will win. I think eventually the Kurds will have their own state.

The Azerbaijanis in Northern Iran will eventuall split from Iran and merge with Azerbaijan. And in the longer term Turkey will merge with all the turkih states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkemenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kirgistan). Stalin tried to prevent Turkish nationalism by split up the Turks into smaller ethnic groups and trying to give them separate identities (hence the names of the countrys). But I don't think this really worked. Turkmen and Uzbekis really think of theselves as Turks.

The Tajiks are persian speakers. I think they will eventually merge with the Tajiks in Afghanistan and with Iran. I think the Pashtuns in Afghanistan will merge with the Pashtuns in Pakistan. So Afghanistan will split in three. The North Eastern portion joining Turkistan, the center merging with a greater Persia and the Easter part becomin part of a greater Pashtunistan. The Baluchis in South Western Pakistan will merge with the Baluchis in Souther Afghanistan and south western Iran. Then of course Pakistan will fall apart, leaving Sindh, the Punjab, Baluchistan becoming part of a greater Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier merging with the Afghan pashtuns to form a greater Pashtunistan.

I think the Chinese understand this and that is why they are doing ethnic cleansing. IN Sinkiang (Eastern Turkistan) provice the people will always want to merge with the Turks on the other side of the border. That is why the Chinese are moving the Han Chines into Sinkiang and into Tibet. They already did it with Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia is only 12% Mongolian now because of the Chinese ethnic dilution program. But with out the cleansing the underlying nationlist force stays.

I am not saying this will happen immediately but I think that these national aspiration will always exist under the surface and so eventually that pressure will win. The only way to stop it is with ethnic cleansing.

I know - I am crazy. But it what I think.

My uninformed Opinion........
 

I generally agree, but with the caveat that there are alternatives to a nation-state, such as an independent polity within a larger federal state. I suspect we will see both ethnic nations seeking self-government as a theme of the century and the development of increasing stronger coalitions of states like the EU.

Someone pointed out the big issue before though, which is the places where many ethnicities share one geography, which defines much of the MiddleEast. These will always be unique areas.

Also, the Swiss are one ethnicity, even if they are bound together more by cleanliness and precision than by common language. A german speaking Swiss has much more in common with a French-speaking one than with another German speaker.

My uninformed Opinion........
 

I think they don't like eachother, just like the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium but are smart enough to see the advantage of their unity.

I just don't think people feel comfortable sharing a government with people who don't speak the same language. They just don't want someone who speaks another language to control their fate. And for some weird reason people feel that need to unite with their linguistic brethern. I guess people think there is strenght in numbers. There is also some romantic nationalist element also.

In the middle East there is not as much Ethnic mixing as you might think. Kurdistan is pretty continuous and there are not a lot of non kurds in their populated areas. In Pakistan and Afghanistan there really is not much mixing. Obviously in the cities there is some mixing but the countryside is mainly ethnically pure and in these countries the overwhelming majority of the population is rural. On the borders there is some mixing (like Iraqi Kurdistan) but is usually government influenced, like Iraq, and when the government influence waines the lines start getting clearer again - like is happening now in Iraqi Kurdistan.

I once drew an Ethnic map of the middle east and you would be surprized how easy it is to divide people up by ethnic lines. It would not be hard for the middle east to become like Europe.

My crazy theory...
 

I should add that I once told Dr. Rice about my theory (when she was at Stanford) and she did not buy into it. She thought the current lines in the middle east could become stable nation states with secure borders. That is why I am pretty sure the Bush administration is not going to want to see Kurdistan split and that they don't think it is inevitable.

My crazy theory...
 

This is one of the scariest things you've ever said.

My crazy theory...
 

So let me ask a procedural question here:

You and I seem to have a very similar view of where Iraq should be going (and I don't pretend to expertise here, just a series of ideas that seem supported by what I see). However, you are very defensive of the administration and their policies, while I frankly feel like they are out of touch and not listening to people with ideas. I find them stubborn and closeminded.

Is the difference just that you have bought into a "team" and declared you faithfulness to the Republican party? Without your clearly deeply-felt party loyalty, what would you think of this administration right now?

My crazy theory...
 

Sorry - didn't mean to freak you out. I should have kept it to myself. When I remembered the conversation I get a little scared. I think it was a good idea to get rid of Saddam and the Taliban but I think the administration will be fighting against the natural order of things if they try and keep Afghanistan and Iraq together.

I really hope she is right and I am wrong.

My uninformed Opinion........
 

You'd be a lousy fortune teller. Nobody wants to hear about the present.

My uninformed Opinion........
 

Dude, can I have some of your cash?

My crazy theory...
 

I really don't like dictators especially ones that really abuse their populations. And especially in countrys where the population is pretty educated and affluent. In poor uneducated countrys you usually exchange one dictator for another (Africa). I think Iraqis are a sophisticated enough country (I think most Arab states fall into this catagory) where a democracy could work and a dictator is not inevitable.

I don't care about US Stratigic Interest. I think our interest lie in there being as many prosperous free market democracyes in the world as possible. That should be our main foreign policy goal.

Saddam Hussein was really brutal and needed to be taken out and I think the Iraqi people can take to democracy. Also when democracies form people usually gravitate to the natural order (nation states).

We will never have stability in the middle east until it is divided by ethnic lines and there are stable prosperous democracies. I think that is inevitable (I should also add that I think democracy is invetible for all societies also - especially when they become affluent). If they stay poor democracy is not inevitable, but econmies will grow if government let them. Unfortunately that is not happening in Africa.

I think taking out Saddam Hussein was a good thing. I think setting up a democracy is a good thing. I think training the Iraq army is a good thing. Those are all steps towards creating a peaceful middle east. Where I differ from the Administration is trying to keep the Kurds and the Arabs together. Same goes for Afghanistan.

I differ with the Administration on many issues (they consider me a problem) but on the issue of taking out Saddam and building a democracy I totally concur.

The Dems have hit on a strategy
 

You been reading too much Chomsky, and listening to too many fellow travellers with cotton in their ears. Liberals - those seeking big govt and wealth redistribution - are deader than Gilligan.

Moderates are grumbling, and demaning a middle-of-the-road candidate. We're all sick of stupid goddamned fiscal liberals wasting money and stupid goddamned alleged republicans who spend like idiot fiscal liberals doing the same.

Here's what 99.999999 % of people want:

1. Decent govt, with a minimal social safety net;

2. Less wasteful pork (bridges to nowhere while stem cell research dies on the vine? WTF???);

3. Less govt interference in our lives (we're regulated to the point of insanity... every do-gooder dimwit thinks the govt can solve our problems by "passing a law" or "issuing a reg" - ENOUGH already);

4. Less taxes; and

5. Less stupid social/private issues like abortion hijakcing the more important debates on fiscal matters).

I see a nation sick of idiots on the far left and right bickering about nonsense, gridlocking all the imprtant businss we have to do. We don't have the luxury anymore of debating nonsense like abortion, or listening to douchebags crying for more social welfare programs. Liberals and Arch-Conservatives have blown their wads. They're done, soon.