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De mortuis nihil nisi bene
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De mortuis nihil nisi bene
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De mortuis nihil nisi bene
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De mortuis nihil nisi bene
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S_A_M |
De mortuis nihil nisi bene
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De mortuis nihil nisi bene
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Fat lotta good that did me. |
more bad news from Iraq
from Andrew Sullivan (who is more than a little excitable, so take this with a grain of salt):
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more bad news from Iraq
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One or the other. At this point, I don't know. |
more bad news from Iraq
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My thoughts: the contrast between relative success in Afghanistan and relative failure in Iraq is very revealing. In Afghanistan, our troops have expended more "Civil Affairs" effort than combat effort. While there have been a couple of points in time when troops were pulled back into combat-only roles or where issues arose over how to execute CA missions (e.g., in uniform or out of uniform, with other aid groups or separately), the military, both ours and the allies, has spent a lot of time engineering new bridges, rebuilding the ring roads, repairing schools, and even helping plant crops. In Iraq, it's too dangerous and we're unwilling to take the risks to engage in the same level of CA activity. And the aid groups are reluctant to wander too far from protection. In Iraq, we did not have a solid national base leading the charge, outside of Kurdistan. In Afghanistan, we knew who the Northern Alliance was and had a good sense of how to work the local alliances. In Iraq, there was a premium on rapid victory, and we let our tactics rule. In Afghanistan, the rapid victory almost took us by surprise - we had prepared for and were preparing the Nothern Alliance for a much more protracted battle, and had thought the battle through in a strategic rather than a tactical manner. So, now that we've learned something, should we be trying to figure out how to do it in a way similar to Afghanistan? Unfortunately, the process of building a local base when signing up with us gets you a free ride to power doesn't necessarily encourage the idealists we need to come to the fore. |
more bad news from Iraq
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more bad news from Iraq
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more bad news from Iraq
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more bad news from Iraq
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more bad news from Iraq
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"We did not and do not agree with the view that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake. It had a clear strategic purpose that it achieved: reshaping the behavior of surrounding regimes, particularly of the Saudis. This helped disrupt the al Qaeda network sufficiently that it has been unable to mount follow-on attacks in the United States and has shifted its attention to the Islamic world, primarily to the Saudis. None of this would have happened without the invasion of Iraq. As frequently happens in warfare, the primary strategic purpose of the war has been forgotten by the Bush administration. Mission creep, the nightmare of all military planners, has taken place. The United States has shifted its focus from coercing neighboring countries into collaborating with the United States against al Qaeda, to building democracy in Iraq. As we put it in May: "The United States must recall its original mission, which was to occupy Iraq in order to prosecute the war against al Qaeda. If that mission is remembered, and the mission creep of reshaping Iraq forgotten, some obvious strategic solutions re-emerge. The first, and most important, is that the United States has no national interest in the nature of Iraqi government or society. Except for not supporting al Qaeda, Iraq's government does not matter."" Or: the war actually went pretty well in achieving it's original strategic purposes, but this sideline bullshit at some point came to center stage and it's all just a big cockup in both conception and execution. Not sure which version is more damning to the Bushies, but there you are. |
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