Quote:
Originally posted by Tyrone Slothrop
I said:
- Club's conception of individual rights -- as least as regards a woman's bodily autonomy -- is a pretty weak one. Woman who act irresponsibly in his book -- e.g., choosing to have non-incestuous sex -- are not deemed to have any real cognizable interests relating to the pregnancy that follows.
In #2602, you quoted that post, and responded:
- Dude you are being ridiculous in your characterization of my position.
Earlier, in #2482, I said:
- Is there a non-rhetorical difference between saying that a woman who engages in non-incestuous consensual sex forfeits the right to autonomy, and saying that you're not going to include the burdens to her in weighing the relative interests relevant to her desire to have an abortion? I'm not seeing it.
In response to which, in #2489, you said:
- I think it goes to how much weight you give the burdens - less if she didn't take proper precautions in the first place.
To which I said, in #2494:
- I fail to see where you are giving any weight at all to the mother's interests. It sounds like you think abortion is OK only if the fetus is entirely oblivious to whatever it experiences. It's not really "balancing" if one side of the scale has nothing on it. It is analytically, simply, I grant you, but only at the cost of ignoring half of a difficult moral equation.
And pointed out that you view property rights differently.
The crux of it is this idea that women who act irresponsibly -- i.e., opt to have sex -- have fewer rights. Or you take their burdens less seriously. It's a morally judgmental view of personal rights that is profoundly unlibertarian -- it's the opposite of libertarianism, really -- and stands in direct contrast to your many and well-developed posts about economic rights. I don't think you've ever said that someone who invests money unwisely can be taxed at higher rates.
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You've left out some of the argument, but that's ok.
Let me try to summarize my position. Keep in mind that I've admitted that this is a very difficult issue for me, and one I haven't resolved.
You seem to want to only look at one side of the equation (i.e., a woman's rights. I am uncomfortable not looking at both sides simultaneously. So while you believe I discount the woman's rights, I'll throw that back at you and say you discount the fetus' rights.
As we both agree that this is a question of balancing rights, let me try to define them. These definitions will be oversimplified, and you are free to expand upon them.
The woman's rights are, essentially, to have dominion over her body and to be free on unwanted pain/burden.
The fetus' rights are to life or potential life and to be free of pain.
The right to dominion over her body and to be free of unwanted pain/burden conflict with the fetus' right to potential life. The issue of pain cannot be answered definitively at this time.
When balancing these competing rights, I tend to be biased towards protecting potential life. This is not to say that the woman's rights are not important. They are extremely important. But I find it hard to choose those rights over a potential life or death decision. I make the same choice when it comes to the death penalty because I find it prudent, when there are unknowns, to side with life. What can possibily be a more important interest than that.
But you are right, I am making a judgement of sorts when comparing the rights of a woman who took precautions v. a woman who did not. I believe that the woman who was responsble is entitled to greater protections. I still end up in the same place today, but who knows how the calculus will come out when we know more.
Rape/incest poses a different calculation, because I put a large multiplyer on the woman's pain, and discount the quality of life of the fetus due to all of the consequences involved.
Although I freely admit that this model has inherent problems, I don't think it is inconsistent with libertarianism. My rights, as a libertarian, are not unlimited. Their border is when they infringe upon the rights of another. This is clearly the case in the abortion context.
