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Originally posted by bilmore
Aren't we accomplishing the coercive aspect simply by our presence?
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Yes.
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If we are, (and I think we are), then we've only set our sights higher than our first goal by taking on a second.
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Higher or "unsupportably and unnecessarily expanded," which is their view. I think their view is that the US went to the house of Iraq to mow the lawn to impress the neighbors, but that doesn't mean that staying to redo the plumbing and wiring also is also a good idea. Particularly when you are a landscaper and not a plumber or electrician.
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Further, what is more coercive to the entire ME problem of despotic states provoking popular rebellion than to push democracy in the neighbor and so set an example of a better way - a more satisfying way, eventually - to rebel than the Islamicists' way?
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The jihadists don't represent popular rebellion. They represent a very specific (and not actually very popular) view of a pan-islamic state standing in opposition to the non-islamic west. Even to the extent that seeing anyone thumb their nose at the local bully is popular, the vast majority of people living in despotic middle-eastern regimes don't particularly want to swap their current despots for al Qaeda, and certainly don't think al Qaeda has their interests any more at heart than the US does.
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After all, the various populations are attracted to the militant Islamicism only because they lack other vision for life improvement - why not show them a more productive way?
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I think that's a naively dismissive view of militant islam, actually. It presumes that its adherents just don't know any better. However, while some of the low-value throw-away grunts (think: the recent unsuccessful attacks on US consolate and saudi intelligence buildings in Saudi Arabia a few weeks ago) may sign up just because they feel oppressed and can't think of anything else to do, the core of the movement seems to be composed of well educated, even western educated, men who are well aware of other options (from democratization to militant secular arabism) and rejected them.
That said, I don't disagree with your view that creating a sucessful democracy somewhere in the ME would be a great defeat for MI. But I suspect Stratfor is correct that the US cannot, in fact, really do anything to achieve that goal, and therefore being seen trying to do it sets the US up to look like it is suffering a defeat, even in a situation in which it has been reasonably sucessful at advancing its national interests (as I think they have been on a number of levels in Iraq).
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I know we've blown some operational issues, but I just don't see this double-damning.
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I think the original strategy was good (actually, impressively devious), but the operational issues blown have been really quite bad. Tho Stratfor also indicates that they think it is a good thing Rummy didn't commit to a bigger force for Iraq early, because that means he now doesn't have additional troops to waste on the mistaken pursuit of the (in their view, at least) unnecessary and wasteful sideline of democratization.
And, GGG, I think the view of many is that instability in Iraq is irrelevant in light of the larger war on terror because, for many internal reasons, even an unstable Iraq is not going to become a welcoming staging & recruiting ground for al Q a la Afghanistan. So your (i) isn't a goal but is irrelevant to larger American purposes because (ii) just isn't realistically in the offing. (Dunno if I agree with that, but I believe that is the way the argument runs.) Now, Saudi Arabia would be another story ...
