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Originally posted by Bad_Rich_Chic
The jihadists don't represent popular rebellion. They represent a very specific (and not actually very popular) view of a pan-islamic state standing in opposition to the non-islamic west. Even to the extent that seeing anyone thumb their nose at the local bully is popular, the vast majority of people living in despotic middle-eastern regimes don't particularly want to swap their current despots for al Qaeda, and certainly don't think al Qaeda has their interests any more at heart than the US does.
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AQ represents a source of power to a long-beaten-down culture that depends to a huge extent on the expression of personal power derived from dominance over whoever is near - a state unexperienced since . . . well, Mohammad's time. They're willing to go that route, at least temporarily, and, when they do, the "temporary" aspect ends too late - it's WWIII. Without trying to sound patronizing, the ME Islamic culture is the most testosterone-laden culture in the world at this time, and the least able to seriously claim that mantle. They're 0-12. They crave a win, and they haven't had one for eons. You can try to reduce this down to a "they see a certain vision of god, and seek to attain it", but I think you do so more out of politeness than accuracy, and, in reality, it's more like "god told them they could win if they joined up, but it just ain't happenin' yet!"
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I think that's a naively dismissive view of militant islam, actually. It presumes that its adherents just don't know any better. However, while some of the low-value throw-away grunts (think: the recent unsuccessful attacks on US consolate and saudi intelligence buildings in Saudi Arabia a few weeks ago) may sign up just because they feel oppressed and can't think of anything else to do, the core of the movement seems to be composed of well educated, even western educated, men who are well aware of other options (from democratization to militant secular arabism) and rejected them.
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You're falling for the "you don't see what I see, and that must be naivite'" meme. Are you on a coast? I've seen this before.
Islamism, like fundamentalist christianity, tends to be a bright spot only when you have no bright spots. It occurs primarily when people see no other hope. A person with money can see a lack of hope quicker than someone struggling for a meal. An educated person can define his lack of hope more clearly than can someone who simply has no bed. A failing culture is failing to its poor, but doubly failing to its most promising - they can more clearly see what they COULD HAVE attained. More to your point, yeah, it occurs when people don't know any better - when they don't know the paths to cultural power, and see service to a gawd as their only possible path. (Yes, this presupposes that such gawd-view is essentially flawed.) Historically, the biggest resurgance of christianity in this country came when the slaves were freed - all of those hopeless, downtrodden people, coming out of generations of darkness, were the biggest repository of hardcore christian faith this country had ever seen. Nothing gels a belief in the tremendum like total adversity. Nothing emphasizes the numinous like the unlivable. Go back and read, and you'll see an increasingly secular society right up to the emancipation, and then, a huge resurgence.
So, how is this different from the virtual slavery of the mass of the ME? I don't think it is. Both masses are as powerful. (Zero equals zero.) In fact, the ME mass is doubly powerless - they are held in thrall by their masters, and their masters keep getting thier asses kicked by the west. What shame! Even their rulers are lame!
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That said, I don't disagree with your view that creating a sucessful democracy somewhere in the ME would be a great defeat for MI. But I suspect Stratfor is correct that the US cannot, in fact, really do anything to achieve that goal, and therefore being seen trying to do it sets the US up to look like it is suffering a defeat, even in a situation in which it has been reasonably sucessful at advancing its national interests (as I think they have been on a number of levels in Iraq).
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I think Stratfor sees it wrong. Stratfor presupposes everyone in the ME hanging back and waiting for success before jumping in. I have more faith. I think they jump in to help the effort. In spite of what you read here, I hear from friends that the Iraqi police are about the most admirable group of guys in the world, and they are being joined daily by more and more people who see a personal responsibility for the cultural morass they have become. I think that we do, at some point, back out - but the "civil war" presumed by some is actually a cleanup effort aimed at 4% of the population. I think that, while it will be bloody, it will be possible.
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I think the original strategy was good (actually, impressively devious), but the operational issues blown have been really quite bad.
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Agree.
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Tho Stratfor also indicates that they think it is a good thing Rummy didn't commit to a bigger force for Iraq early, because that means he now doesn't have additional troops to waste on the mistaken pursuit of the (in their view, at least) unnecessary and wasteful sideline of democratization.
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Again, Stratfor is essentially negative and wrong. Too many troops would have kept us from the worldview that we are actually going to let the Iraqis fix themselves. We kept it below imperialism - that's a big thing over there. Stratfor would have us trying to convince everyone that we had no imperialistic view, and that's an unwinnable fight if we have 300,000 over there.