Quote:
Originally posted by sgtclub
Not small relative to our forces there, but very small as an indication of whether this is a true insurgency.
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I'm not sure what number you're looking for to make it big enough to be an insugency. For other examples, I'd ask how many Nicaraguans served with the contras, as a percentage of the population?
Quote:
Originally posted by sgtclub
You're right, I have not read anything on this. Do you have cites?
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You might try searching the WaPo website. I think there was a large article this weekend, but my recollection might be off (sleep deprivation).
Quote:
Originally posted by sgtclub
At its heart, I don't think this is a battle against the US. I think it's a battle against other Iraquis, a battle that is not winnable for the reasons stated in the article I posted. The best they can hope for is long term chaos, but by sheer numbers and economics, they are never going to win nor garner anywhere near a majority to back them. It is also not based on ideaology, but rather, sheer power.
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I'd say there are elements of both, certainly -- but (to nitpick) it can still be an insurgency if it is directed against a domestic government. The insurgents may not be able to "win" power in the long term -- but if the Sunni radicals are successful in creating chaos over the medium to long term, then the perception will be that the U.S. has lost. Many people will also perceive that the U.S. had screwed Iraq up. [Many people will ultimately choose stability and certainty under a dictatorship to chaos and random murder in the streets.]
Perception is tremendously important in this fight, whether you view Iraq as a discrete war or as part of our ongoing battle against radical Islamism, which will last a generation or two.
