Quote:
Originally posted by Gattigap
Protection of State Department officials traditionally has been a function of the Marines, as I understand it.
I get your point that we're not asking Blackwater to retake Fallujah, but that doesn't really counter Ty's point that we wouldn't have to hire these dudes in the first place if we weren't so overstretched with our traditional forces, and if the Administration weren't so enamored generally speaking with the idea of privatizing big chunks of what Marines and soldiers have done for decades.
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Everyone in this discussion is at least partly right.
Marines guard embassies, and provide some limited personal security services. The State Dept. (like some other govt. agencies) also has an internal security department (staffed with lots of ex-military guys) who typically handle personal protection for diplomats and personnel when needed.
Sebby is right that the Army typically doesn't do personal proection/bodyguard work [that is a specialized field] -- and isn't often used for convoy security for other government agencies. But that is not because they COULD NOT do the convoy jobs (in theory), it is that they have other missions. The counter-example is that SOF teams are sometimes used to provide personal security to very high level officials -- including (for a long time) Karzai in Afghanistan.
But Ty is also right in a sense that Blackwater and these other contractors are needed because we "don't have enough soldiers." It is not that we don't have enough soldiers to protect the convoys (although we don't) -- but
that we don't have enough soldiers to impose and maintain peace and security. If it wasn't an active low-intensity conflict, this wouldn't be an issue.
Tangent #1:
We'll never know now, but a build-up of overwhelming force from the start could have made a huge difference. Some of that failing is due to Rumsfeld's unfortunate obsession with light, lean forces and the political need for speed. Part is that failing is also due to the simple fact that our force structure was so different in 2003 than in 1991. After 10+ years of bipartisan post-Cold War draw-downs in search of the "peace dividend", we just don't have the same numbers to throw around that we did in the first Gulf War.
Tangent #2:
Doesn't mean it wasn't a g-ddamned stupid decision to invade in the first place, which I've become more convinced of as time went on.
S_A_M
