Quote:
Originally posted by Secret_Agent_Man
We'll never know now, but a build-up of overwhelming force from the start could have made a huge difference. Some of that failing is due to Rumsfeld's unfortunate obsession with light, lean forces and the political need for speed. Part is that failing is also due to the simple fact that our force structure was so different in 2003 than in 1991. After 10+ years of bipartisan post-Cold War draw-downs in search of the "peace dividend", we just don't have the same numbers to throw around that we did in the first Gulf War.
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We also had more numbers in the first Gulf War because President G. H. W. Bush put together a true international coalition that had significant numbers of troops from many other countries. Had the White House listened to what some in the Pentagon (e.g., Gen. Shinseki) were saying about force requirements, they might reasonably have come to the conclusion that they couldn't make the war work unless they had a significant numbers of troops from other countries, both to have a presence to maintain order and because an international force would have seemed less like occupiers. As I see it, the White House opposition to this stemmed partly from a view that the U.S. would be stronger if other countries believed it could do this sort of thing unilaterally, and partly because the President does not like to have to collaborate with anyone. As to the first, the irony is that the result has been to weaken us by underscoring the limits of our power.
