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[Tyrone Slothrop]

Originally Posted by sebastian_dangerfield

You're mixing two issues. Banks are unique in terms of risk. But in terms of judging how banks are run, you judge them just like any other business. If a bank is well run, it is a success. If it is poorly run and requires a bailout, it has been run to some extent by losers, fools, incompetents. It is a failed business.

If a bank is poorly run and requires a bailout, it has been run poorly and it is a failed business. BUT: If a bank is not poorly run and is caught up in a banking run and requires a bailout, that does not mean it has been run poorly and is a failed business. It means there has been a banking run.

But you are correct that there is a justified "heads I win, tails you lose" element to banking. The Feds (or state if so chartered) will have to run in and save any bank going under. So unlike the guy who owns a business and can't make payroll, a bank will never crash and burn. At worst, it'll be forced to sell itself to some other bank or in an extreme situation it will be run off through a receivership. The same applies to insurers.

Adder was arguing that the banks in 2008 weren't failed businesses. That they were holding assets which actually had value. He's wrong. If the assets had value, the banks could have received loans in exchange for collateral positions, or even received unsecured loans based on balance sheet strength. But we know that wasn't true. We know that the banks in 2008 were loaded up with overvalued securities and collateral. They suffered a cash crunch. Just like a business that has tons of receivables which become delinquent, cash flow to these banks was outstripped by their obligations. And in that moment where a business doesn't have enough cash to keep going, that business has failed.

Some of the banks had good assets but could not get loans because there was a liquidity crisis. Or the shadow banks, if you will, since much of what had happened in the preceding years was that banks figured out how to take exposure in ways that evaded the regulatory regime. Here is how Wikipedia explains a liquidity crisis:

In financial economics, a liquidity crisis refers to an acute shortage (or "drying up") of liquidity. Liquidity may refer to market liquidity (the ease with which an asset can be converted into a liquid medium, e.g. cash), funding liquidity (the ease with which borrowers can obtain external funding), or accounting liquidity (the health of an institution's balance sheet measured in terms of its cash-like assets). Additionally, some economists define a market to be liquid if it can absorb "liquidity trades" (sale of securities by investors to meet sudden needs for cash) without large changes in price. This shortage of liquidity could reflect a fall in asset prices below their long run fundamental price, deterioration in external financing conditions, reduction in the number of market participants, or simply difficulty in trading assets.

The above-mentioned forces mutually reinforce each other during a liquidity crisis. Market participants in need of cash find it hard to locate potential trading partners to sell their assets. This may result either due to limited market participation or because of a decrease in cash held by financial market participants. Thus asset holders may be forced to sell their assets at a price below the long term fundamental price. Borrowers typically face higher loan costs and collateral requirements, compared to periods of ample liquidity, and unsecured debt is nearly impossible to obtain. Typically, during a liquidity crisis, the interbank lending market does not function smoothly either.

Several mechanisms operating through the mutual reinforcement of asset market liquidity and funding liquidity can amplify the effects of a small negative shock to the economy and result in lack of liquidity and eventually a full blown financial crisis....

One of the mechanisms, that can work to amplify the effects of a small negative shock to the economy, is the Balance Sheet Mechanism. Under this mechanism, a negative shock in the financial market lowers asset prices and erodes the financial institution's capital thus worsening its balance sheet. Consequently, two liquidity spirals come into effect, which amplify the impact of the initial negative shock. In an attempt to maintain its leverage ratio, the financial institution must sell its assets, precisely at a time when their price is low. Thus, assuming that asset prices depend on the health of investors' balance sheet, erosion of investors' net worth further reduces asset prices, which feeds back into their balance sheet and so on. This is what Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) term as the "loss spiral". At the same time, lending standards and margins tighten, leading to the "margin spiral". Both these effects cause the borrowers to engage in a fire sale, lowering prices and deteriorating external financing conditions.

Apart from the "Balance Sheet Mechanism" described above, the lending channel can also dry up for reasons exogenous to the borrower's credit worthiness. For instance, banks may become concerned about their future access to capital markets in the event of a negative shock and may engage in precautionary hoarding of funds. This would result in reduction of funds available in the economy and a slowdown in economic activity. Additionally, the fact that most financial institutions are simultaneously engaged in lending and borrowing can give rise to a Network effect. In a setting that involves multiple parties, a gridlock can occur when concerns about counterparty credit risk result in failure to cancel out offsetting positions. Each party then has to hold additional funds to protect itself against the risks that are not netted out, reducing liquidity in the market. These mechanisms may explain the 'gridlock' observed in the interbank lending market during the recent subprime crisis, when banks were unwilling to lend to each other and instead hoarded their reserves.

You are right that part of the problem was that some of the bank's assets were overvalued. If that were the only problem, all of this would be much simpler. But banks are not bookstores.