Politics As Usual

[the Spartan]

Originally posted by Sidd Finch
Penske, this is pretty clever. In another 999 posts, it'll balance out your right-wing crap (assuming you've retired all of those socks).

Whifferooneriski, as the Paigow might say (I miss her much, [sniff]).

I have been riding herd, roughly, over Mario the cubicle mate all afternoon. Plus, no pictures. Remember. Follow. the. Pictures. connect. the dots.

Thanks for playing though.

[Tyrone Slothrop]

Originally posted by Hank Chinaski
I'm fairly sure its illegal to call a Senator fat in SF. I know I could be fined, but don't about prior restraint.

It's not classy or fancy, but I don't know about illegal.

[the Spartan]

Originally posted by Hank Chinaski
This raises the question, who is the fattest senator? women have come a long way, baby! the 2 fattest Senators are women! mikulski wins for highest body fat %. But she's short.


I'll trust Penske to put up the best hill picture. i think hill being taller probably wins for most weight to lose. am i forgetting anyone?

This probably doesn't count because she was pregnant (with Satan's spawn) but that's some pooch (enough to wilt my preggo fetish):

[SlaveNoMore]

the Spartan
Whifferooneriski, as the Paigow might say (I miss her much, [sniff]).

Memo to File:

If this name-changing crap and incessant praise is your lead-up to another Starkanian-RB bait and switch scheme whereby she returns as Spartan and you revert to Self Employed Fluffer, something on a coke can or another one of your socks, I'm flagging it
:flag:

[the Spartan]

Originally posted by Hank Chinaski
mikulski wins for highest body fat %. But she's short.

Btb, just in case anyone was worried that I was slipping, I’m not. It just took me a while to dig down deep into my trove of political commentary to come out with an oldie but goodie on the esteemed Senator Porky…..Chubby?

Senator Mikulski is Porker of the Month for September ‘02

That was just the latest in a long line of honours in a distinguished career that reaches back to her childhood acting days where she was a member of the reknowned pioneers of television, Our Gang aka the Lil' Rascals, and portrayed Chubby (then):




And now:

[the Spartan]

Originally posted by SlaveNoMore
Memo to File:

If this name-changing crap and incessant praise is your lead-up to another Starkanian-RB bait and switch scheme

It wasn't Stark. It was Bert Harbinson.

[Not Me]

Originally posted by Tyrone Slothrop
Please point me to a single case that says that it is presumptively OK for the government to regulate speech, based on its content,* so long as the speech occurs somewhere other than a public forum.

Just one case. One of the cases you've been reading, presumably.

CORNELIUS v. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & ED. FUND, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)

• The issue presented is whether respondents have a First Amendment right to solicit contributions that was violated by their exclusion from the CFC. To resolve this issue we must first decide whether solicitation in the context of the CFC is speech protected by the First Amendment, for, if it is not, we need go no further. Assuming that such solicitation is protected speech, we must identify the nature of the forum, because the extent to which the Government may limit access depends on whether the forum is public or nonpublic. Finally, we must assess whether the justifications for exclusion from the relevant forum satisfy the requisite standard. Applying this analysis, we find that respondents' solicitation is protected speech occurring in the context of a nonpublic forum and that the Government's reasons for excluding respondents from the CFC appear, at least facially, to satisfy the reasonableness standard. We express no opinion on the question whether petitioner's explanation is merely a pretext for viewpoint discrimination. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
  
  . . . .
  
  Having identified the forum as the CFC, we must decide whether it is nonpublic or public in nature. Most relevant in this regard, of course, is Perry Education Assn. There the Court identified three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum. Traditional public fora are those places which "by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate." 460 U.S., at 45 . Public streets and parks fall into this category. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). In addition to traditional public fora, a public forum may be created by government designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects. Perry Education Assn., supra, at 45 and 46, n. 7. Of course, the government "is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility." Id., at 46.
  
  . . . .
  
  Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral. Perry Education Assn., supra, at 49. Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum, see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created, see Perry Education Assn., supra, the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to resolve whether the government's denial of access to respondents was viewpoint based, because it determined that respondents' exclusion was unreasonable in light of the purpose served by the CFC.
  
  . . . .
  
  Based on the present record, we disagree and conclude that respondents may be excluded from the CFC. The Court of Appeals' conclusion to the contrary fails to reflect the nature of a nonpublic forum. The Government's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation. In contrast to a public forum, a finding of strict incompatibility between the nature of the speech or the identity of the speaker and the functioning of the nonpublic forum is not mandated. Cf. Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Lehman v. City [473 U.S. 788, 809] of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). Even if some incompatibility with general expressive activity were required, the CFC would meet the requirement because it would be administratively unmanageable if access could not be curtailed in a reasonable manner. Nor is there a requirement that the restriction be narrowly tailored or that the Government's interest be compelling. The First Amendment does not demand unrestricted access to a nonpublic forum merely because use of that forum may be the most efficient means of delivering the speaker's message. See United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S., at 129 . Rarely will a nonpublic forum provide the only means of contact with a particular audience. Here, as in Perry Education Assn., supra, at 53-54, the speakers have access to alternative channels, including direct mail and in-person solicitation outside the workplace, to solicit contributions from federal employees.
  
  The reasonableness of the Government's restriction of access to a nonpublic forum must be assessed in the light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances. Here the President could reasonably conclude that a dollar directly spent on providing food or shelter to the needy is more beneficial than a dollar spent on litigation that might or might not result in aid to the needy. Moreover, avoiding the appearance of political favoritism is a valid justification for limiting speech in a nonpublic forum. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S., at 839 ; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, supra, at 304. In furthering this interest, the Government is not bound by decisions of other executive agencies made in other contexts. Thus, respondents' tax status, while perhaps relevant, does not determine the reasonableness of the Government's conclusion that participation by such agencies in the CFC will create the appearance of favoritism.
  
  The Court of Appeals' rejection of the Government's interest in avoiding controversy that would disrupt the workplace and adversely affect the Campaign is inconsistent with our [473 U.S. 788, 810] prior cases. In Perry Education Assn., supra, at 52, we noted that "exclusion of the rival union may reasonably be considered a means of insuring labor peace within the schools." Similarly, the exclusion of respondents may reasonably be considered a means of "insuring peace" in the federal workplace. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals rejected this reason for lack of conclusive proof of an actual effect on the workplace, it ignored the teachings of this Court that the Government need not wait until havoc is wreaked to restrict access to a nonpublic forum. 460 U.S., at 52 , n. 12.
  
  Finally, the record amply supports an inference that respondents' participation in the CFC jeopardized the success of the Campaign. OPM submitted a number of letters from federal employees and managers, as well as from Chairmen of local Federal Coordinating Committees and Members of Congress expressing concern about the inclusion of groups termed "political" or "nontraditional" in the CFC. More than 80 percent of this correspondence related requests that the CFC be restricted to "non-political," "non-advocacy," or "traditional" charitable organizations. Deposition of P. Kent Bailey, Program Analyst for OPM, App. 275, 276. In addition, OPM received approximately 1,450 telephone calls complaining about the inclusion of respondents and similar agencies in the 1983 Campaign. Id., at 286. Many Campaign workers indicated that extra effort was required to persuade disgruntled employees to contribute. Id., at 287. The evidence indicated that the number of contributors had declined in some areas. Id., at 305. Other areas reported significant declines in the amount of contributions. See Executive Orders 12353 and 12404 as they Regulate the Combined Federal Campaign (Part 1), Hearing before the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 67 (1983) (statement of Donald J. Devine, Director, OPM). Thus, the record adequately supported petitioner's position that respondents' continued participation in the Campaign would be detrimental to the Campaign and disruptive of the federal [473 U.S. 788, 811] workplace. Although the avoidance of controversy is not a valid ground for restricting speech in a public forum, a nonpublic forum by definition is not dedicated to general debate or the free exchange of ideas.The First Amendment does not forbid a viewpoint-neutral exclusion of speakers who would disrupt a nonpublic forum and hinder its effectiveness for its intended purpose.

I think perhaps what you are saying is that the government cannot engage in non-viewpoint neutral suppression of speech in non-public forums. That is true but different from content-based regulation, which includes subject matter restrictions.

[Tyrone Slothrop]

Originally posted by Not Me
I think perhaps what you are saying is that the government cannot engage in non-viewpoint neutral suppression of speech in non-public forums. That is true but different from content-based regulation, which includes subject matter restrictions.

I already told you that "I'm talking about political speech." That was in the footnote that you omitted when you quoted my post. As I said in that footnote, there are other types of content-based restrictions that are not a problem. But the government doesn't get to discriminate on the basis of a political viewpoint, whether on government property or private property, without strict scrutiny.

[Mmmm, Burger (C.J.)]

I hope this wasn't posted already. Well, not really, because it's still funny:



I'm sure it will pull some votes from the repubs at least. And cement them as the "people's choice"

[Not Me]

Originally posted by Tyrone Slothrop
I already told you that "I'm talking about political speech." That was in the footnote that you omitted when you quoted my post. As I said in that footnote, there are other types of content-based restrictions that are not a problem. But the government doesn't get to discriminate on the basis of a political viewpoint, whether on government property or private property, without strict scrutiny.

On the basis of viewpoint, the government can't discriminate at all. But that isn't what you said. You said content-based. Content based is not synonymous with viewpoint based. The question to be answered is was the protester ejected on the basis of viewpoint or rather (as was held by the USSC to be constitutional) to avoid a disruption. The protestor is saying on the basis of viewpoint. Those who ejected the protestor said to avoid a disruption. It is very clear that avoiding a disruption is a valid grounds for suppressing speech in an non-public forum. That is not a time, manner, place restriction. That is content-based.

Read this part of the case I posted again:

"The First Amendment does not forbid a viewpoint-neutral exclusion of speakers who would disrupt a nonpublic forum and hinder its effectiveness for its intended purpose."

Was the purpose of the event to debate the merits of GWB's admin? Were the T-shirts wearers hindering the effectiveness of the event for its intended purpose? Or were they ejected for their viewpoints. Those are questions we can debate. But we cannot debate that the standard for a non-public forum content-based suppression of speech is reasonableness, not strict scrutiny. Read the cases if you want to know more.

[Tyrone Slothrop]

Originally posted by Not Me
On the basis of viewpoint, that is true. But that isn't what you said. You said content-based. Content based is not synonymous with viewpoint based. The question to be answered is was the protester ejected on the basis of viewpoint or rather (as was held by the USSC to be constitutional) to avoid a disruption. The protestor is saying on the basis of viewpoint. Those who ejected the protestor said to avoid a disruption. It is very clear that avoiding a disruption is a valid grounds for suppressing speech in an non-public forum. That is not a time, manner, place restriction. That is content-based.

Read this part of the case I posted again:

"The First Amendment does not forbid a viewpoint-neutral exclusion of speakers who would disrupt a nonpublic forum and hinder its effectiveness for its intended purpose."

Was the purpose of the event to debate the merits of GWB's admin? Were the T-shirts wearers hindering the effectiveness of the event for its intended purpose? Or were they ejected for their viewpoints. Those are questions we can debate. But we cannot debate that the standard for a non-public forum content-based suppression of speech is reasonableness, not strict scrutiny. Read the cases if you want to know more.

Burger previously floated the idea that you are now toying with -- that you can suppress certain political speech on the rationale that it may cause a disruption, and that therefore the discrimination against it is really not viewpoint-based. If you think you have a case that stands for that proposition -- the one you are relying on has to do with organizations seeking to join a fundraising drive in federal offices -- by all means, post it. But Burger was smart enough not pursue that line of thinking, since it would gut the First Amendment's protection of unpopular political speech. They weren't kicking people out with tee shirts with political speech on them -- they were kicking out the two people wearing anti-Bush messages. The First Amendment doesn't allow this.

[Not Me]

Originally posted by Tyrone Slothrop
I already told you that "I'm talking about political speech." That was in the footnote that you omitted when you quoted my post. As I said in that footnote, there are other types of content-based restrictions that are not a problem. But the government doesn't get to discriminate on the basis of a political viewpoint, whether on government property or private property, without strict scrutiny.

I will help you educate yourself more:

PERRY ED. ASSN. v. PERRY LOCAL EDUCATORS' ASSN., 460 U.S. 37 (1983)

• In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed. At one end of the spectrum are streets and parks which "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 -536 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 115; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
  
  A second category consists of public property which the State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university meeting facilities); City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board meeting); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal theater). 7 [460 U.S. 37, 46] Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum. Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest. Widmar v. Vincent, supra, at 269-270.
  
  Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication is governed by different standards. We have recognized that the "First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government." United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., supra, at 129. In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view. 453 U.S., at 131 , n. 7. As we have stated on several occasions, "`"[t]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."'" Id., at 129-130, quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976), in turn quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
  
  . . . .
  
  In the Court of Appeals' view, however, the access policy adopted by the Perry schools favors [460 U.S. 37, 49] a particular viewpoint, that of PEA, on labor relations, and consequently must be strictly scrutinized regardless of whether a public forum is involved. There is, however, no indication that the School Board intended to discourage one viewpoint and advance another. We believe it is more accurate to characterize the access policy as based on the status of the respective unions rather than their views. Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. These distinctions may be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and inescapable in the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended purpose of the property. The touchstone for evaluating these distinctions is whether they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves.

Get it now?

[Atticus Grinch]

Originally posted by Not Me
I will help you educate yourself more:

I love how Penske's socks move heaven and earth to rationalize and add [sneer]nuance[/sneer] to things that would have given him apoplexy in 1996 or so. Meanwhile, John Kerry has the audacity to serve in a war he grew to oppose, John Edwards has the audacity to be rich, and Hillary Clinton has the audacity to have cankles. If only we could put the board's best minds on the defense of cankles! Think what we could accomplish!

[sgtclub]

Originally posted by Atticus Grinch
If only we could put the board's best minds on the defense of cankles! Think what we could accomplish!

There is no such defense

[ltl/fb]

Originally posted by sgtclub
There is no such defense

Because all those R politicians are total hotties. Physically perfect. God, I just want to throw them down and fuck them all!