A Forum for Grinches and Ho-Ho-Hoes

[bilmore]

Originally posted by Bad_Rich_Chic
Not sure which version is more damning to the Bushies, but there you are.

Aren't we accomplishing the coercive aspect simply by our presence? If we are, (and I think we are), then we've only set our sights higher than our first goal by taking on a second. Further, what is more coercive to the entire ME problem of despotic states provoking popular rebellion than to push democracy in the neighbor and so set an example of a better way - a more satisfying way, eventually - to rebel than the Islamicists' way? After all, the various populations are attracted to the militant Islamicism only because they lack other vision for life improvement - why not show them a more productive way?

I know we've blown some operational issues, but I just don't see this double-damning.

[Greedy,Greedy,Greedy]

Originally posted by Bad_Rich_Chic
Not only is Sullivan excitable, he (intentionally?) misstates the actual point of the article he quotes from. Its not that the US lost the opportunity to win the "war to control the insurgency or create democracy," it's that that wasn't the war we were actually there fighting (which has actually been rather successful), but the admin appears to have come to mistake its spin for a real goal, thus creating problems for itself (because the "spin" goal for the war was inherently contradictory and unachievable and, worse, irrelevant to US interests). A better "money" quote, IMHO:

"We did not and do not agree with the view that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake. It had a clear strategic purpose that it achieved: reshaping the behavior of surrounding regimes, particularly of the Saudis. This helped disrupt the al Qaeda network sufficiently that it has been unable to mount follow-on attacks in the United States and has shifted its attention to the Islamic world, primarily to the Saudis. None of this would have happened without the invasion of Iraq.

As frequently happens in warfare, the primary strategic purpose of the war has been forgotten by the Bush administration. Mission creep, the nightmare of all military planners, has taken place. The United States has shifted its focus from coercing neighboring countries into collaborating with the United States against al Qaeda, to building democracy in Iraq. As we put it in May: "The United States must recall its original mission, which was to occupy Iraq in order to prosecute the war against al Qaeda. If that mission is remembered, and the mission creep of reshaping Iraq forgotten, some obvious strategic solutions re-emerge. The first, and most important, is that the United States has no national interest in the nature of Iraqi government or society. Except for not supporting al Qaeda, Iraq's government does not matter.""

Or: the war actually went pretty well in achieving it's original strategic purposes, but this sideline bullshit at some point came to center stage and it's all just a big cockup in both conception and execution.

Not sure which version is more damning to the Bushies, but there you are.

If that's the goal, there are two problems: (i) it seems to make regional instability in the short term a primary goal of US foreign policy, which I find hard to believe; and (ii) in order to work in the long run Iraq must not become an unstable area similar to the Caucuses or the Taliban-era Afghanistan, where there is a rats nest of terrorist training grounds in an area where it is difficult to project police or military authority.

Point (ii) above means that if the Bushies were crazy enough for regional instability to be their goal, as a tool in combating terrorism, they really need to accomplish stabilization and installation of a new Iraq regime, preferably democratic, not because of mission creap, but because to do otherwise would undercut the original mission.

[Sidd Finch]

Originally posted by Greedy,Greedy,Greedy
If that's the goal, there are two problems: (i) it seems to make regional instability in the short term a primary goal of US foreign policy, which I find hard to believe; and (ii) in order to work in the long run Iraq must not become an unstable area similar to the Caucuses or the Taliban-era Afghanistan, where there is a rats nest of terrorist training grounds in an area where it is difficult to project police or military authority.

(iii) It would be good if the Iraqis do not use their new-found democratic rights to elect, say, Moqtada-al-Sadr.

This is somewhat tongue-in-cheek, but the Mideast may prove the old right-wing saw that some people just aren't "ready" for democracy.

[Bad_Rich_Chic]

Originally posted by bilmore
Aren't we accomplishing the coercive aspect simply by our presence?

Yes.

If we are, (and I think we are), then we've only set our sights higher than our first goal by taking on a second.

Higher or "unsupportably and unnecessarily expanded," which is their view. I think their view is that the US went to the house of Iraq to mow the lawn to impress the neighbors, but that doesn't mean that staying to redo the plumbing and wiring also is also a good idea. Particularly when you are a landscaper and not a plumber or electrician.

Further, what is more coercive to the entire ME problem of despotic states provoking popular rebellion than to push democracy in the neighbor and so set an example of a better way - a more satisfying way, eventually - to rebel than the Islamicists' way?

The jihadists don't represent popular rebellion. They represent a very specific (and not actually very popular) view of a pan-islamic state standing in opposition to the non-islamic west. Even to the extent that seeing anyone thumb their nose at the local bully is popular, the vast majority of people living in despotic middle-eastern regimes don't particularly want to swap their current despots for al Qaeda, and certainly don't think al Qaeda has their interests any more at heart than the US does.

After all, the various populations are attracted to the militant Islamicism only because they lack other vision for life improvement - why not show them a more productive way?

I think that's a naively dismissive view of militant islam, actually. It presumes that its adherents just don't know any better. However, while some of the low-value throw-away grunts (think: the recent unsuccessful attacks on US consolate and saudi intelligence buildings in Saudi Arabia a few weeks ago) may sign up just because they feel oppressed and can't think of anything else to do, the core of the movement seems to be composed of well educated, even western educated, men who are well aware of other options (from democratization to militant secular arabism) and rejected them.

That said, I don't disagree with your view that creating a sucessful democracy somewhere in the ME would be a great defeat for MI. But I suspect Stratfor is correct that the US cannot, in fact, really do anything to achieve that goal, and therefore being seen trying to do it sets the US up to look like it is suffering a defeat, even in a situation in which it has been reasonably sucessful at advancing its national interests (as I think they have been on a number of levels in Iraq).

I know we've blown some operational issues, but I just don't see this double-damning.

I think the original strategy was good (actually, impressively devious), but the operational issues blown have been really quite bad. Tho Stratfor also indicates that they think it is a good thing Rummy didn't commit to a bigger force for Iraq early, because that means he now doesn't have additional troops to waste on the mistaken pursuit of the (in their view, at least) unnecessary and wasteful sideline of democratization.

And, GGG, I think the view of many is that instability in Iraq is irrelevant in light of the larger war on terror because, for many internal reasons, even an unstable Iraq is not going to become a welcoming staging & recruiting ground for al Q a la Afghanistan. So your (i) isn't a goal but is irrelevant to larger American purposes because (ii) just isn't realistically in the offing. (Dunno if I agree with that, but I believe that is the way the argument runs.) Now, Saudi Arabia would be another story ...

[Tyrone Slothrop]

Originally posted by Bad_Rich_Chic
A better "money" quote, IMHO:

"We did not and do not agree with the view that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake. It had a clear strategic purpose that it achieved: reshaping the behavior of surrounding regimes, particularly of the Saudis. This helped disrupt the al Qaeda network sufficiently that it has been unable to mount follow-on attacks in the United States and has shifted its attention to the Islamic world, primarily to the Saudis. None of this would have happened without the invasion of Iraq.

I'm not sure I agree with this. We have shown neighboring countries that we are willing to use force, but we also have made clearer the limits on our force. Without sufficient forces to secure Iraq, we are in no position to invade anyone else now. I also don't understand why we think invading Iraq has "reshaped" Saudi behavior. The Saudis are more threatened by Al Qaeda than we are. I don't seem any plausible nexus between the invasion of Iraq and whatever disruption of Al Qaeda has happened -- other countries (like Pakistan) were cooperating with us post-9/11 and pre-Iraq, and it is this cooperation that made the difference. Iraq was not supporting Al Qaeda, of course. To suggest that the disruption of Al Qaeda would not have happened without the invasion of Iraq is, in a word, ludicrous. Indeed, the invasion of Iraq has been counterproductive in some respects. It has been well chronicled that military resources were diverted from Afghanistan -- where we are still dealing with what's left of a regime that actually did support Al Qaeda -- to Iraq, and I have posted previously about how our focus on Iraq cost us Syria's assistance with Al Qaeda.

As frequently happens in warfare, the primary strategic purpose of the war has been forgotten by the Bush administration. Mission creep, the nightmare of all military planners, has taken place. The United States has shifted its focus from coercing neighboring countries into collaborating with the United States against al Qaeda, to building democracy in Iraq.

Had we only been interesting in coercing other countries, we could have gone to the brink with Hussein and then accepting something short of full capitulation from him -- weapons inspectors, etc. But we didn't want to coerce him, we wanted to replace him. The mission creep you describe includes the war itself.

[Bad_Rich_Chic]

Originally posted by Tyrone Slothrop
I'm not sure I agree with this.

Me either. Certainly Sullivan doesn't, but he pretends they agree with him (i.e.: the war is now a total loss).

We have shown neighboring countries that we are willing to use force, but we also have made clearer the limits on our force. Without sufficient forces to secure Iraq, we are in no position to invade anyone else now.

I think Stratfor believes that is one excellent reason it was a mistake to try to secure Iraq. If they were shut of trying to keep a lid on that mess, our troops would be free to wreak havoc elsewhere, like stomping on those alleged jihadist camps in Syria, conduct interesting border raids into Iran, stage cooperative strikes with local intelligence agencies in Saudi Arabia, etc.

Had we only been interesting in coercing other countries, we could have gone to the brink with Hussein and then accepting something short of full capitulation from him -- weapons inspectors, etc.

I disagree. The source of our coercive power is having a pantload of our troops on the ground in Iraq. Now, had that partial capitulation Saddam's you posit included permitting the US to set up humongous bases from which to "monitor" his WMD and otherwise kick al Q butt in all the neighboring region, replacing him might indeed have been unnecessary to the primary goals of the war.

[Tyrone Slothrop]

Originally posted by Bad_Rich_Chic
The source of our coercive power is having a pantload of our troops on the ground in Iraq. Now, had that partial capitulation Saddam's you posit included permitting the US to set up humongous bases from which to "monitor" his WMD and otherwise kick al Q butt in all the neighboring region, replacing him might indeed have been unnecessary to the primary goals of the war.

I don't agree with the view that our war aims were limited to coercing countries in the region to cooperating more with us, and was trying to make the point that our behavior leading up to the war suggests that the planners took my view, not yours. Woodward's book (for example) makes pretty clear that Bush settled on a course of invading Iraq early on, and never really entertained an alternative course.

[Sidd Finch]

Originally posted by Bad_Rich_Chic
I disagree. The source of our coercive power is having a pantload of our troops on the ground in Iraq. Now, had that partial capitulation Saddam's you posit included permitting the US to set up humongous bases from which to "monitor" his WMD and otherwise kick al Q butt in all the neighboring region, replacing him might indeed have been unnecessary to the primary goals of the war.

How is this coercing the Saudi government to do anything? You cannot possibly think that the current regime fears a US invasion. We're more likely to invade England.

[Bad_Rich_Chic]

Originally posted by Tyrone Slothrop
I don't agree with the view that our war aims were limited to coercing countries in the region to cooperating more with us, and was trying to make the point that our behavior leading up to the war suggests that the planners took my view, not yours. Woodward's book (for example) makes pretty clear that Bush settled on a course of invading Iraq early on, and never really entertained an alternative course.

I don't see why any of that supports your view (primary goal was regime change - wait, was this your view?) any more than it does mine (primary goal was securing a well-situated long-term troop base in region). I'll even throw in "sanctions & policing were not getting desired results and were really damn expensive and tended to make the US/UN look incapable of follow-through on threats," which argues for regime change regardless of other strategic goals, though in that view regime change itself could be seen as a mere tool for forwarding a different strategic goal in the WOT - beign seen in the islamic world as a bad-ass that would actually punish those who made themselves our enemies. But the two goals are really quite complimentary; permitting relative instability in Iraq actually achieves both goals, the "keeping troops there" goal particularly. In fact, if the US hadn't set itself up as the savior of international democracy, we could have quite a convenient arrangement, as we do in Afghanistan, where we aren't really doing much by way of providing security but have a fairly free hand in the outskirts of the country to conduct raids into neighboring hostile territory. (Hmm, I'm beginning to see the logic of Stratfor's position more and more.)

None of that makes Iraqi democratization a more (or less) useful goal for forwarding US strategic interests vs. militant islam.

[Bad_Rich_Chic]

Originally posted by Sidd Finch
How is this coercing the Saudi government to do anything? You cannot possibly think that the current regime fears a US invasion. We're more likely to invade England.

We don't have to invade to carry out tactical operations. See UEA and Pakistan (yes, I know that formally we deny engaging in operations in Pakistan). And, in SA, the threat of taking out al Q operatives by drone (or kidnapping or whatever) is particuarly nasty, since they are well aware we consider some members of the ruling family to be such. And all of that is much easier when we are already nearby.

But the coersion of SA was a bit more subtle than that. Invading Iraq permitted us to pull our bases out of SA, allowing the ruling class to realize "oh, shit, we sort of depend on US military support & presence to back us up in the face of popular opposition to our rather unpopular regime" and then bend over backwards to help us enough just to keep us from publicly telling them "fuck off, you're on your own and good luck to you," but not so much as to inflame popular rebellion because they are a US puppet. Compared to either of those, both of which would probably result in a fairly quick dispatching of the house of al Saud, a model democracy in Iraq is a distant threat to their regime survival.

[Tyrone Slothrop]

Originally posted by Bad_Rich_Chic
I don't see why any of that supports your view (primary goal was regime change - wait, was this your view?) any more than it does mine (primary goal was securing a well-situated long-term troop base in region).

Perhaps we need to slice this more finely. I think my view better describes George Bush's motivations, but your view may better describe the motivations of at least some of those working for him.

I'll even throw in "sanctions & policing were not getting desired results and were really damn expensive and tended to make the US/UN look incapable of follow-through on threats," which argues for regime change regardless of other strategic goals, though in that view regime change itself could be seen as a mere tool for forwarding a different strategic goal in the WOT - beign seen in the islamic world as a bad-ass that would actually punish those who made themselves our enemies.

I think the first half of this was key for Bush -- he had no patience for the continuing low-intensity war with Hussein, and wanted resolution. The second half of it is consistent with his thinking, but I'm not sure how much it motivated him.

But the two goals are really quite complimentary; permitting relative instability in Iraq actually achieves both goals, the "keeping troops there" goal particularly. In fact, if the US hadn't set itself up as the savior of international democracy, we could have quite a convenient arrangement, as we do in Afghanistan, where we aren't really doing much by way of providing security but have a fairly free hand in the outskirts of the country to conduct raids into neighboring hostile territory. (Hmm, I'm beginning to see the logic of Stratfor's position more and more.)

I understand that there's a certain logic to this, particularly if you think our greatest enemies are likely to be unsympathetic, capable states. But this is lunacy if you think our greatest enemies are the sort of terrorist movements (for example) that are fed and make use of failed states. And I think Bush truly believes in the goal of making Iraq a successful democracy, whereas you seem to be thinking it's a PR conceit.

[Sidd Finch]

Originally posted by Bad_Rich_Chic
We don't have to invade to carry out tactical operations. See UEA and Pakistan (yes, I know that formally we deny engaging in operations in Pakistan). And, in SA, the threat of taking out al Q operatives by drone (or kidnapping or whatever) is particuarly nasty, since they are well aware we consider some members of the ruling family to be such. And all of that is much easier when we are already nearby.

The Third Army doesn't usually do covert ops.

But the coersion of SA was a bit more subtle than that. Invading Iraq permitted us to pull our bases out of SA, allowing the ruling class to realize "oh, shit, we sort of depend on US military support & presence to back us up in the face of popular opposition to our rather unpopular regime" and then bend over backwards to help us enough just to keep us from publicly telling them "fuck off, you're on your own and good luck to you," but not so much as to inflame popular rebellion because they are a US puppet. Compared to either of those, both of which would probably result in a fairly quick dispatching of the house of al Saud, a model democracy in Iraq is a distant threat to their regime survival.

There is absolutely no chance on earth that the US would tell the Saudis "fuck off you're on your own." If anything, the threat of radical Islam in Saudi Arabia makes it more necessary for the US to support the House of Saud, not less so.

Perhaps the threat of massive instability in Iraq, coupled with the possibility that it will be more hospitable to al Qaeda than it ever was under Hussein, has led the Saudis to worry about al Qaeda within its borders. But motivating the Saudis by creating a risk that al Qaeda elements within Iraq will cooperate with those in Saudi Arabia hardly seems like a victory for US policy.

[Adder]

Originally posted by bilmore
After all, the various populations are attracted to the militant Islamicism only because they lack other vision for life improvement - why not show them a more productive way?

Oversimplify much, George?

[bilmore]

Originally posted by Bad_Rich_Chic
The jihadists don't represent popular rebellion. They represent a very specific (and not actually very popular) view of a pan-islamic state standing in opposition to the non-islamic west. Even to the extent that seeing anyone thumb their nose at the local bully is popular, the vast majority of people living in despotic middle-eastern regimes don't particularly want to swap their current despots for al Qaeda, and certainly don't think al Qaeda has their interests any more at heart than the US does.

AQ represents a source of power to a long-beaten-down culture that depends to a huge extent on the expression of personal power derived from dominance over whoever is near - a state unexperienced since . . . well, Mohammad's time. They're willing to go that route, at least temporarily, and, when they do, the "temporary" aspect ends too late - it's WWIII. Without trying to sound patronizing, the ME Islamic culture is the most testosterone-laden culture in the world at this time, and the least able to seriously claim that mantle. They're 0-12. They crave a win, and they haven't had one for eons. You can try to reduce this down to a "they see a certain vision of god, and seek to attain it", but I think you do so more out of politeness than accuracy, and, in reality, it's more like "god told them they could win if they joined up, but it just ain't happenin' yet!"

I think that's a naively dismissive view of militant islam, actually. It presumes that its adherents just don't know any better. However, while some of the low-value throw-away grunts (think: the recent unsuccessful attacks on US consolate and saudi intelligence buildings in Saudi Arabia a few weeks ago) may sign up just because they feel oppressed and can't think of anything else to do, the core of the movement seems to be composed of well educated, even western educated, men who are well aware of other options (from democratization to militant secular arabism) and rejected them.

You're falling for the "you don't see what I see, and that must be naivite'" meme. Are you on a coast? I've seen this before.

Islamism, like fundamentalist christianity, tends to be a bright spot only when you have no bright spots. It occurs primarily when people see no other hope. A person with money can see a lack of hope quicker than someone struggling for a meal. An educated person can define his lack of hope more clearly than can someone who simply has no bed. A failing culture is failing to its poor, but doubly failing to its most promising - they can more clearly see what they COULD HAVE attained. More to your point, yeah, it occurs when people don't know any better - when they don't know the paths to cultural power, and see service to a gawd as their only possible path. (Yes, this presupposes that such gawd-view is essentially flawed.) Historically, the biggest resurgance of christianity in this country came when the slaves were freed - all of those hopeless, downtrodden people, coming out of generations of darkness, were the biggest repository of hardcore christian faith this country had ever seen. Nothing gels a belief in the tremendum like total adversity. Nothing emphasizes the numinous like the unlivable. Go back and read, and you'll see an increasingly secular society right up to the emancipation, and then, a huge resurgence.

So, how is this different from the virtual slavery of the mass of the ME? I don't think it is. Both masses are as powerful. (Zero equals zero.) In fact, the ME mass is doubly powerless - they are held in thrall by their masters, and their masters keep getting thier asses kicked by the west. What shame! Even their rulers are lame!

That said, I don't disagree with your view that creating a sucessful democracy somewhere in the ME would be a great defeat for MI. But I suspect Stratfor is correct that the US cannot, in fact, really do anything to achieve that goal, and therefore being seen trying to do it sets the US up to look like it is suffering a defeat, even in a situation in which it has been reasonably sucessful at advancing its national interests (as I think they have been on a number of levels in Iraq).

I think Stratfor sees it wrong. Stratfor presupposes everyone in the ME hanging back and waiting for success before jumping in. I have more faith. I think they jump in to help the effort. In spite of what you read here, I hear from friends that the Iraqi police are about the most admirable group of guys in the world, and they are being joined daily by more and more people who see a personal responsibility for the cultural morass they have become. I think that we do, at some point, back out - but the "civil war" presumed by some is actually a cleanup effort aimed at 4% of the population. I think that, while it will be bloody, it will be possible.

I think the original strategy was good (actually, impressively devious), but the operational issues blown have been really quite bad.

Agree.

Tho Stratfor also indicates that they think it is a good thing Rummy didn't commit to a bigger force for Iraq early, because that means he now doesn't have additional troops to waste on the mistaken pursuit of the (in their view, at least) unnecessary and wasteful sideline of democratization.

Again, Stratfor is essentially negative and wrong. Too many troops would have kept us from the worldview that we are actually going to let the Iraqis fix themselves. We kept it below imperialism - that's a big thing over there. Stratfor would have us trying to convince everyone that we had no imperialistic view, and that's an unwinnable fight if we have 300,000 over there.

[bilmore]

Originally posted by Adder
Oversimplify much, George?

Do I have to go back and say that I see the same role for christian fundamentalism, or even just strong christianity, to get you to forego the obvious "ooo, he's racist and religionist!" shit?

Underthink much?